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THE END OF ANTITRUST HISTORY REVISITED 
THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE.  By 
Tim Wu.  New York, N.Y.: Columbia Global Reports.  2018.  Pp. 154.  
$14.99. 
Reviewed by Lina M. Khan∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission reported  
to Congress that “the state of the U.S. antitrust laws” was “sound.”1   
Created by lawmakers to examine whether antitrust laws should be re-
vised, the bipartisan Commission concluded that existing statutes were 
sufficiently flexible to address emerging issues, and that courts, antitrust 
agencies, and practitioners were now in proper agreement that “con-
sumer welfare” was the “unifying goal of antitrust law.”2  A decade later, 
the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section delivered a similar as-
sessment, remarking that “the Nation’s system of competition enforce-
ment has been in good hands.”3  These reports represented a high-water 
mark of agreement within the antitrust community that, despite ongoing 
debates about specific doctrinal tests or particular standards of proof, 
antitrust law was, altogether, on the right course.  The fact that antitrust 
had shed its public appeal in favor of an expert-driven enterprise — 
becoming “less democratic and more technocratic”4 — was generally 
seen as further evidence of its success.5 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.  This Review reflects my per-
sonal views and not those of the Committee or any of its members.  For insightful comments and 
conversations, I am grateful to Eleanor Fox, David Grewal, Lev Menand, John Newman, and Mar-
shall Steinbaum.  Many thanks to the Harvard Law Review for thoughtful feedback and careful 
editing. 
 1 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS i (2007). 
 2 Id. at 35; see id. at 32. 
 3 AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION REPORT: 
THE STATE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2 (2017). 
 4 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008). 
 5 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 583, 585 (2018) (“Over the last fifty years antitrust has become much more technical, 
particularly in areas such as merger enforcement and exclusionary behavior, but also in more col-
lateral areas such as assessing causation and measuring damages.  As its technical competence has 
increased, its ‘movement’ quality has faded into the background or become political noise.  Simul-
taneously, technical antitrust has become less interesting to politicians, who cannot win elections by 
talking about the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or average variable cost.”).  But cf. Harry First & 
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Today, however, it is clear that what may have appeared as the end 
of antitrust history proved instead to be a prolonged pause in an endur-
ing clash over the purpose and values of the U.S. antitrust laws.6  Over 
the last few years, the relative stability of the antitrust consensus has 
yielded to a sharp rupture.7  Two aspects of this break are most notable: 
first, the fact that the debate cuts to foundational questions about the 
goals of antitrust, and second, its highly public-facing nature.  No longer 
relegated to law journals and practitioner conferences, antitrust has once 
again been thrust to the forefront of public conversation, prompting 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544–46, 2572–
74 (2013) (criticizing the shift of antitrust away from its democratic roots). 
 6 Cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) (declaring 
that the spread of economic and political liberalism marked a lasting and stable ideological end 
point).  Not all antitrust scholars adopted this “end of history” view of the field.  See, e.g., William 
E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as 
a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1989) (predicting “that deconcentration 
will reemerge as a significant policy concern in antitrust’s second century”). 
 7 Many, including myself, have participated in this contestation.  See, e.g., BARRY C. LYNN, 
CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 
(2010) (identifying the various dangers of monopoly and arguing for restoring antitrust law); K. 
SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2016) (arguing that laws structuring 
the economy, including antitrust, should be focused on preventing economic domination); Lina 
Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its 
Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017) (arguing that the enfeebling of antitrust as a 
check on concentrated private power has likely contributed to economic inequality); Frank 
Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2013) (identifying 
antitrust law at its best as a tool for checking the power of dominant firms); Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust 
as Allocation of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Har-
vard Law School Library) (reframing antitrust as an enterprise that allocates economic coordination 
rights and arguing that this allocating constitutes the core function of antitrust); Maurice E. Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012) (arguing that enhancing efficiency 
should not be the sole aim of antitrust and identifying economic freedom, a level playing field, and 
fairness as additional desirable goals); Maurice E. Stucke & Marshall Steinbaum, The Effective 
Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (arguing that replacing the consumer welfare standard 
with an “effective competition” standard will help reorient antitrust towards dispersing concen-
trated private power); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Tax-
onomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014) (identifying ways in which exercises 
of power by large corporations function as forms of private governance and arguing that antitrust 
law and policy should be treated as a critical tool of democracy reformers); Sandeep Vaheesan, 
Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded Ages, 78 MD. L. REV. 766 
(2019) (arguing that enforcement should be reoriented towards controlling the power of large cor-
porations rather than targeting workers who organize for higher wages and improved working 
conditions); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 744 (2017) (ar-
guing that a welfare-based approach to antitrust neglects critical structural considerations, as evi-
denced by Amazon); Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul, THE ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-democrats-killed-their-
populist-soul/ 504710 [https://perma.cc/9FAC-R673] (tracing Democrats’ abandonment of antimo-
nopoly politics). 
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front-page headlines,8 congressional hearings and investigations,9 maga-
zine covers,10 and discussion at a presidential debate.11  Antitrust law has 
been transformed quickly from a relatively settled and sequestered domain 
of expertise to an area of active debate, with its future now something to 
be constructed rather than inherited.  
Professor Tim Wu’s The Curse of Bigness is a book for this moment.  
In just under 150 pages, Wu offers a sweeping history of antitrust law 
and traces how it is that, in his view, antitrust became unmoored from 
its central tenets and animating principles.  The book presents a diag-
nosis and a bold call to arms, seeking to recover a republican theory of 
antimonopoly and to rehabilitate robust antitrust enforcement.  Writing 
about a specialized area of law for a generalist audience inevitably ex-
poses an author to criticism, which Wu has drawn.12  But assessing the 
book solely as an academic contribution misunderstands the theory of 
change reflected in Wu’s choice of format.  The Curse of Bigness is written 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See, e.g., Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Justice Department Is Preparing Antitrust 
Investigation of Google, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-
is-preparing-antitrust-investigation-of-google-11559348795 [https://perma.cc/ZR3J-ZBJE]; Steve 
Lohr, House Antitrust Panel Seeks Documents from 4 Big Tech Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://nyti.ms/31f9LyN [https://perma.cc/M9AQ-G9SF]; Tony Romm, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig 
Timberg, Justice Department Announces Broad Antitrust Review of Big Tech, WASH. POST (July 
23, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/23/justice-department-announces-
antitrust-review-big-tech-threatening-facebook-google-with-more-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/72YS-
S2TP]; David Streitfeld, To Take Down Big Tech, They First Need to Reinvent the Law, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 20, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2J8QAiv [https://perma.cc/Z9XB-UND2]. 
 9 See, e.g., Press Release, House Judiciary Committee, House Judiciary Committee Launches 
Bipartisan Investigation into Competition in Digital Markets (June 3, 2019), https://judiciary. 
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2051 [https://perma.cc/6GZG-T45K] (an-
nouncing that the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and  
Administrative Law was initiating a broad investigation into the state of competition in digital 
markets and the adequacy of existing laws); Hearings: Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 1: 
The Free and Diverse Press, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 11, 2019), https://judiciary. 
house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2260 [https://perma.cc/G36J-R3CF]; Hearings: 
Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 2: Innovation and Entrepreneurship, HOUSE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE (July 16, 2019), https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx? EventID=2258 
[https://perma.cc/E63T-M667]; Hearings: Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of 
Data and Privacy in Competition, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Sept. 12, 2019), https:// 
judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2294 [https://perma.cc/ T2P4-E8ND]. 
 10 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, The Case Against Google, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2C7Sb6Y [https://perma.cc/WKB8-4EQQ]; Too Much of a Good Thing, THE 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/03/26/too-much-of-a-good-
thing [https://perma.cc/FU6B-MDTQ]. 
 11 See Naomi Nix, Ben Brody & David McLaughlin, Democrats Slam Corporate Power with 
Vow of Antitrust Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/  
articles/2019-06-27/democrats-slam-corporate-power-with-vow-of-antitrust-crackdown [https:// 
perma.cc/7PZ2-8D7M]. 
 12 See, e.g., Douglas Ginsburg, Judging a Book: Ginsburg Reviews ‘The Curse of Bigness,’ 
LAW360 (Dec. 3, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1099074 [https://perma.cc/ 
T9QC-WWU3]. 
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for a mainstream audience because Wu believes that reinvigorating an-
titrust will require more than winning over academics or practitioners.  
Instead, informing and engaging the public — including advocates, or-
ganizers, policymakers, journalists, and other general readers — is a 
prerequisite for creating the political pressure needed to reorient antitrust 
around the antimonopoly values it has abandoned in recent decades.13 
This Review builds on Wu’s book to explain the significance of the 
current rupture in antitrust and to situate it within a broader intellectual 
trajectory.  Debates over the foundational purpose of antitrust are not 
new, and examining how this latest clash fits alongside previous contes-
tations is essential for understanding what has yielded the current con-
testability and assessing the competing visions.  
Part I of this Review summarizes Wu’s chief contributions in The 
Curse of Bigness, focusing on three tenets that form the basis of the 
book.  Part II offers an analytic breakdown of the overhaul in antitrust 
doctrine that is the subject of Wu’s critique, tracing the transformation 
of antitrust to changes in descriptive claims and normative assumptions 
that the Chicago School introduced.  I argue that framing Chicago’s 
interventions this way lets us map the current antitrust debate with 
greater coherence.  Doing so, moreover, reveals the limits of proffered 
correctives to the Chicago School and underscores the need for what has 
been called a “Neo-Brandeisian” program in law and political economy.  
Part III argues that a central component of the Neo-Brandeisian project 
should include reforming the institutional structure of antitrust law and 
policy.  Although most critiques of present-day antitrust focus on doc-
trinal rules and the substantive legal framework that governs antitrust 
analysis, the exclusive reliance on a common law approach to antitrust 
is a key source and enabler of current dysfunctions.  Complementing (or 
even largely supplanting) this common law structure with an adminis-
trative approach would both equip antitrust to keep pace with evolving 
business practices and new market realities and help democratize anti-
trust in the ways that Wu and other reformers champion. 
I.  THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 
Wu’s The Curse of Bigness is structured around three key tenets:  
(1) that antitrust and antimonopoly are central to America’s political 
tradition and critical safeguards of a democratic republic (pp. 16–19); (2) 
that the structure of our economy inextricably shapes our experience as 
citizens (pp. 39–44); and (3) that the decades-long project to defang an-
titrust is the product of an intellectual revolution that redefined how we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 As used by contemporary antitrust reformers, “antimonopoly” refers to a framework that 
seeks to control and check private concentrations of economic power.  Promoting antimonopoly 
does not categorically require promoting competition or decentralization, and it relies on a toolkit 
broader than just antitrust.  Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly 
Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 131 (2018). 
  
2020] THE END OF ANTITRUST HISTORY REVISITED 1659 
assess competition through adopting “consumer welfare” as the law’s 
only goal (pp. 88–91, 135). 
First, Wu makes clear that his aim is to help recenter antitrust as a 
key “check on private power as necessary in a functioning democracy” 
(p. 19).  Revisiting the legislative history of antitrust, he notes that law-
makers passed antitrust laws with the expressly political goal of pre-
venting economic autocracy and prohibiting coercive conduct (pp. 30–
31).14  He analogizes antitrust to constitutional law, both in function and 
in import, following a tradition of scholars who have explored what it 
means for antitrust to serve a constitutional role (p. 54).15  Wu draws 
out two distinct aspects of this constitutional dimension.  He argues that 
the passage of the antitrust laws reflected a “[c]onstitutional choice in 
industrial and national policy,” suggesting that lawmakers passed anti-
trust laws in order to codify a set of foundational principles that were 
to set the backdrop of American life (p. 17).  Analogizing antitrust to the 
checks and balances of the U.S. constitutional system, Wu also under-
scores how constitutional design and antitrust law both reflect a distrust 
of concentrated power (p. 31).  The steady erosion of antitrust, then, is 
a threat not just to open markets and fair competition, but to the basis 
of democratic governance. 
Second, Wu makes the case that economic concentration inextricably 
shapes our experience as citizens and that how we structure our markets 
is foremost a political question that demands critical public engagement 
(p. 33).16  This tenet is most directly an echo of Justice Brandeis, whose 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 Somewhat perplexingly, while Wu relies heavily on the legislative history of the Sherman Act 
to establish its republican roots, he also suggests that parsing this history for an original purpose is 
a lost cause: “Let us not spend any more time on the impossible task of trying to find the true 
original meaning of the Sherman Act” (p. 32). 
 15 See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
377, 381 (1965) (describing antitrust as “an integral part of the economic constitution of the United 
States”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1217, 1231 
(2001) (stating that “[t]he Sherman Act of 1890 . . . is a classic super-statute,” id. at 1231, or a law 
that can be considered “quasi-constitutional,” id. at 1217); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust  
Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 88–93 (2013) (describing antitrust as “a rule against private reg-
ulation,” id. at 88, that is akin to private nondelegation, a constitutional doctrine).  But cf. Daniel 
A. Crane, “The Magna Carta of Free Enterprise” Really?, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 17, 23 (2013) 
(“[T]he U.S. antitrust laws are not understood as constitutional in any meaningful sense.”). 
 16 Wu writes:  
This book aspires to resurrect and try to renovate the lost tenets of the Brandeisian eco-
nomic vision.  It envisions a vigorous, healthy economy, a skepticism of the self-serving 
rhetoric projecting the romance of big business or the inevitability of monopoly, and, 
above all, a sensitivity to human ends.  Brandeis took matters like bigness and concentra-
tion as inseparable from the very nature of democracy, and the conditions under which its 
citizens would live.  They determined what kind of country we would live in and what 
kind of environment that country would provide for its citizens.  (p. 33)  
This basic idea was also captured by Justice Harlan in his partial dissent in Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. United States, 222 U.S. 1 (1911), the government’s major antitrust lawsuit against 
Standard Oil that resulted in the break-up of the corporation.  Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring in 
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1934 book is a namesake for Wu’s.17  Justice Brandeis analyzed the phe-
nomenology of concentrated private power, examining how living in a 
nation of monopolies and oligopolies — being subject to their whims 
and arbitrary dictates — shaped the experience of civic life.18  Wu, chan-
neling Justice Brandeis, answers that it leads to “a certain inhumanity,” 
likely to both “rob the American people of their character” and “sup-
press[] industrial liberty” (p. 41).19  The analysis focuses on how having 
one’s life largely governed by unaccountable private power tends to un-
dermine liberty and self-determination.  “We like to speak of freedoms 
in the abstract, but for most people, a sense of autonomy is more influ-
enced by private forces and economic structure than by government” (p. 
40), Wu writes, explaining that Justice Brandeis viewed “real freedom 
as freedom from both public and private coercion” (p. 41).  The threat 
to liberty posed by monopoly — which can be understood as a form of 
private sovereign — remains a “major blind spot for contemporary lib-
ertarianism, which is rightly concerned with government overreach but 
bizarrely tolerant of mistreatment or abuse committed by so-called pri-
vate actors” (p. 41 n.*).20 
A striking corollary to the idea that extreme economic concentration 
undermines personal and political liberty is that it can also facilitate the 
rise of fascism.  A major current underlying Wu’s book is that failing to 
police the growth and incursion of extreme concentrations of private 
power will not just come at the expense of certain republican ideals but, 
instead, threatens democracy altogether (p. 139).  Wu argues that the 
German Republic’s acceptance of monopolies and concentrated industry 
in key markets helped give rise to Hitler, and that the mid-century push 
for reviving antitrust in the United States was driven, in part, by fears 
that — absent intervention — America, too, could fall subject to the 
same fate (pp. 79–82).21  In the lead-up to the passage of the Anti-Merger 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
part, and dissenting in part) (“The Nation had been rid of human slavery — fortunately, as all now 
feel — but the conviction was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of 
slavery sought to be fastened on the American people, namely, the slavery that would result from 
aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and corporations controlling, for their own 
profit and advantage exclusively, the entire business of the country, including the production and 
sale of the necessaries of life.”). 
 17 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS 
D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934). 
 18 See generally id. 
 19 In the last quotation, Wu quotes LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND 
HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 48 (1914). 
 20 See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS 
RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 37–74 (2017). 
 21 Wu adds that “the real political support for the laws in the postwar period came from the fact 
that they were understood as a bulwark against the terrifying examples of Japan, Italy, and most 
of all the Third Reich” (p. 79).  See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Democracy: A Case 
Study from German Fascism (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-
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Act of 1950, both of the bill’s chief sponsors discussed how halting the rising 
tide of economic concentration was critical for avoiding totalitarianism.22 
Third, Wu pegs the enfeebling of antitrust to an intellectual shift 
ushered in by the Chicago School (pp. 83–92).  The Chicago School be-
gan with a group of economists and lawyers primarily associated with 
the University of Chicago (pp. 84–85).  Its key founders included  
Professors Aaron Director, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler and the 
group grew to include figures such as Professor Ward Bowman and 
then-Professors Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Robert Bork 
(pp. 84–85).  Backed by money from the Volker Fund, the group estab-
lished a project to “promote private enterprise.”23  Their scholarship  
applied neoclassical price theory to the study of legal rules and, in par-
ticular, to the analysis of antitrust.24  Under the guidance of Director, 
students and researchers studied various antitrust doctrines through the 
lens of price theory, criticizing prevailing case law and theories of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
009, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3164467 [https://perma.cc/47UF-
PRA4]. 
 22 See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16,452 (1950) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver) (“I am not an 
alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other nations where mergers and concentrations 
have placed economic control in the hands of a very few people is too clear to pass over easily.  A 
point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in this country, where the public 
steps in to take over when concentration and monopoly gain too much power.  The taking over by 
the public through its government always follows one or two methods and has one or two political 
results.  It either results in a Fascist state or the nationalization of industries and thereafter a  
Socialist or Communist state.”); 95 CONG. REC. 11,486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) 
(“I want to point out the danger of this trend toward more and better combines.  I read from a 
report filed with former Secretary of War Royall as to the history of the cartelization and concen-
tration of industry in Germany: ‘Germany under the Nazi set-up built up a great series of industrial 
monopolies in steel, rubber, coal and other materials.  The monopolies soon got control of Germany, 
brought Hitler to power and forced virtually the whole world into war.’”).  A decade earlier,  
President Roosevelt had also warned that increasing concentration of private power could eventu-
ally yield fascism.  See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Concentration 
of Economic Power (Apr. 29, 1938), https://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/research/faculty-
research/new-deal/roosevelt-speeches/fr042938.htm [https://perma.cc/D73S-Q4LD] (“Unhappy 
events abroad have retaught us two simple truths about the liberty of a democratic people.  The 
first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private 
power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.  That, in its essence, 
is fascism — ownership of government by an individual, by a group, or by any other controlling 
private power.”). 
 23 Edmund W. Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 
1932–1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 180–81 (1983) (quoting Director in a discussion held March 21–
23, 1981, in Los Angeles). 
 24 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 
(1979) (noting that Director’s conclusions involved “viewing antitrust policy through the lens of 
price theory”).  Although the Chicago School is often described as ushering in the “law and econom-
ics” movement, the first law and economics movement traces back to the Progressive Era.  See 
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND 
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT, at viii (1998).  This “first law and economics 
movement” was comprised of institutional economists, the most prominent of whom include  
Professors J.M. Clark, John Commons, Richard Ely, Walton Hamilton, and Robert Hale.  See id. at 5. 
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harm.25  Perhaps the “most influential” of these efforts, Wu notes, was 
Bork’s paper revisiting the legislative history of the Sherman Act and 
concluding that the sole purpose of the antitrust laws was to maximize 
consumer welfare (p. 88).  Although a long list of scholars would subse-
quently debunk Bork’s claim,26 the Supreme Court adopted Bork’s fic-
titious account.27 
The embrace of consumer welfare by courts and enforcers alike 
“threw out the broader concerns that had long animated the [Sherman] 
Act and its enforcement” (p. 89).  Under the new paradigm, harm to 
competition would manifest solely as harm to allocative efficiency in the 
form of higher prices or lower output.  Wu observes that Chicago’s 
framework pledged economic rigor yet neglected to consider a host of 
economic costs, including stagnation and stunted innovation (p. 90).  “In 
truth,” Wu writes, “Robert Bork’s attack on antitrust was really laissez-
faire reincarnated” (p. 91).  With the codification of Chicago’s ideas, 
antitrust “lost its traditional goals” (p. 103). 
Several factors enabled ideas once considered “lunatic fringe”28 to 
redefine antitrust.  Channeling the work of Professor William Kovacic, 
Wu notes that Chicago’s triumph relied on key concessions from and 
alliances with the Harvard School, comprised of centrist scholars and 
enforcers such as Professors Donald Turner and Phil Areeda and then-
Judge Stephen Breyer (p. 103).29  Kovacic’s analysis focuses on how the 
institutional concerns that occupied Harvard School thinkers (such as 
their misgivings about expansive private rights of action under the U.S. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an 
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements 
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); John L. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 81 (1975); John L. Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 
J.L. & ECON. 321 (1968).  Bowman later noted that much of his article reflected Director’s thinking.  
See Kitch, supra note 23, at 200 (“It happens that my name appears on an article on tie-ins. Eighty 
percent of that article is Aaron Director . . . .” (footnote omitted)).   
 26 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent” and 
the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 263–64 (1988); Eleanor M. 
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1146–49 
(1981); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68–71 (1982). 
 27 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act 
as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 
66 (1978))). 
 28 Posner, supra note 24, at 931 (“In some quarters the Chicago school was regarded as little 
better than a lunatic fringe.”). 
 29 See also Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 
1919 (2009) (book review) (“Whereas the Chicago School tends to argue for the robustness of mar-
kets and hence for minimal need for regulatory interventions, the Harvard School tends to focus on 
the institutional limitations of governmental actors — regulators, judges, and juries — to correct 
even real market failures.  Conjunctively, the two schools often tend toward similar noninterven-
tionist results.”); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for 
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 47–50. 
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antitrust system) led them to embrace some of the same prescriptions as 
Chicago.30  Wu adds that these scholars were also haunted by critiques 
that antitrust enforcement had become arbitrary and unjustifiably ag-
gressive, nothing short of “the blind firing of muskets at companies that 
just seemed bad” (p. 103).  Meanwhile price theory, along with the con-
sumer welfare standard, appeared to promise a disciplined and rigorous 
approach to enforcement.  A decades-long attack by Chicago on the ex-
isting paradigm had left Harvard School academics more susceptible 
to — and perhaps less critical of — Chicago’s interventions (p. 105).  As 
the ideological makeup of the federal judiciary shifted, courts adopted 
Chicago’s theories much more readily. 
Within a decade the Chicago movement began encountering some 
resistance from what is referred to as the “Post-Chicago School,” a group 
of economists and lawyers that “emerged to challenge many of  
[Chicago’s] basic premises” (p. 107).  Whereas Chicago scholars had in-
troduced general theories, Post-Chicago academics sought to qualify 
them, circumscribing the set of conditions under which Chicago’s pre-
dictions would hold.  Yet despite their interventions, “the antimonopoly 
provisions of the Sherman Act went into a deep freeze from which they 
have never really recovered” (p. 108).  Our economy today reflects this 
neglect, with highly concentrated product and labor markets along with 
a tech industry that, while once open and dynamic, is increasingly closed 
and controlled (pp. 114–26). 
Wu closes by sketching the outlines of a Neo-Brandeisian agenda 
that would resuscitate antitrust.  He recommends a merger enforcement 
program that would fulfill Congress’s mandate to arrest mergers even 
when concentration is in its incipiency, and he proposes that antitrust 
agencies open up merger review to greater public scrutiny and account-
ability (pp. 127–30).  He urges a return to the “big case” tradition that 
targeted AT&T and Microsoft (pp. 93–101), and implores enforcers to 
recover corporate breakups as a mainstay antitrust remedy, observing 
that the administrative difficulty of structural remedies is often over-
stated and the benefits (including the “self-executing” nature of 
breakups) underappreciated (pp. 132–33).  Finally, Wu calls for antitrust 
to abandon consumer welfare as its stated goal and return to a “protec-
tion of competition” test, which is more faithful to legislative history and 
earlier precedent (pp. 135–37).  Building on scholarship by Professors 
Barak Orbach and Eleanor Fox,31 among others, Wu observes that the 
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 30 Kovacic, supra note 29, at 40–42, 50–62. 
 31 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2013) (“The big 
choice is between outcome orientation, on the one hand, and concern for process as well as outcome, 
on the other.  Do we value the process of rivalry, relatively open access, and contestability of markets 
by entrepreneurs and firms without market power?  Or should we limit antitrust condemnation to 
acts that provably lessen output?”); Khan, supra note 7, at 744 (“[T]he Chicago School shifted the 
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goal of preserving competition is “focused on protection of a process,” 
whereas promoting consumer welfare prioritizes “the maximization of a 
value” (p. 136).  Refocusing antitrust on protecting the competitive pro-
cess, Wu argues, would bring enforcement more in line with actual busi-
ness realities while also reflecting congressional intent. 
Wu’s lucid book offers a compelling account of why antitrust has 
gone awry.  His critique and reform agenda have helped inform a 
broader public discussion about what antitrust stands for, what failed 
enforcement has delivered, and what’s at stake with recovering an ap-
proach to antitrust that is anchored in its antimonopoly roots.  Return-
ing antitrust to its founding values, as Wu reminds us, is fundamentally 
about recovering a framework that recognizes the economic and politi-
cal threats posed by concentrated private power. 
Fully realizing the antimonopoly values that Wu seeks to recover, 
however, will require more than antitrust.  One cost of placing antitrust 
at the center of an antimonopoly agenda is that doing so can risk sug-
gesting that competition or decentralization are ends in themselves,  
rather than means for checking private domination and securing free-
dom.32  When faced with natural monopolies, for example, public utility 
regulations provide a way to preserve economies of scale while prevent-
ing the exploitative practices that monopolistic control enables.33  In the 
context of workers or small enterprises, meanwhile, permitting coordi-
nation through labor laws or antitrust exemptions can enable forms of 
organizing that are critical for rebalancing power.34  Given current chal-
lenges — including the dominance of a small number of technology plat-
forms, certain aspects of which seem to exhibit natural monopoly fea-
tures, and the revival of antitrust as an antiworker tool — recognizing 
competition as one among several mechanisms for checking concen-
trated private power is especially critical.35  Doing so will also help re-
new antimonopoly principles for a twenty-first-century paradigm, one 
that builds on — rather than replicates — the Brandeisian era. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
analytical emphasis away from process — the conditions necessary for competition — and toward 
an outcome — namely, consumer welfare.”); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2254 (2013) (“Federal antitrust statutes stress the significance of compe-
tition and appear to declare the preservation of competition as their goal. . . . [T]he preservation of 
competition in business has always served as the most intuitive and obvious goal of competition 
laws.”). 
32 RAHMAN, supra note 7; Khan, supra note 13, at 131–32. 
33  K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of 
the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018) (identifying public utility principles 
as key for confronting private control of essential goods and services). 
34 Paul, supra note 7. 
35 Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019) 
(identifying how Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Apple serve as dominant intermediaries in digital 
markets); Vaheesan, supra note 7. 
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II.  SITUATING NEO-BRANDEIS 
Wu pulls no punches in his critique of the Chicago School, depicting 
its antitrust intervention as a project that supplanted democratically en-
acted laws with a pro-monopoly agenda.  Yet as he notes, the Chicago 
School has not gone unchallenged: by the 1980s, Post-Chicago schol-
ars — lawyers and economists “who were chagrined and dismayed by 
the misuse of economic tools to justify a laissez-faire ideology” — were 
publishing extensive rebuttals to Bork and his colleagues (p. 108).  What 
Wu doesn’t explain is why, despite Post-Chicago’s efforts, Chicago has 
remained dominant and what, if anything, distinguishes the New 
Brandeis School from Post-Chicago.  Would appointing more enforcers 
and federal judges who are receptive to Post-Chicago arguments be suf-
ficient to rehabilitate antitrust in the ways that Wu urges?  It is possible 
that parsing distinctions between schools of antitrust falls beyond the 
scope of Wu’s book because it is aimed at a generalist audience.  Yet the 
omission risks understating the case for the New Brandeis agenda.  
Clearly situating the New Brandeis movement in the wider context of 
current and historical antitrust debates is critical for championing its 
project.36 
Situating Neo-Brandeisian ideas, in turn, requires further explicating 
the Chicago School transformation of antitrust as well as the Post-Chicago 
modifications.  The Chicago School revolution in antitrust entailed a 
twofold shift.  The first was presented as a descriptive change that of-
fered a new set of assumptions about how firms behave under various 
conditions and what effects this behavior is likely to have.  The second, 
meanwhile, was an expressly normative shift that replaced a republican 
theory of antitrust with a neoliberal one, holding that the goal of anti-
trust law should be to promote efficiency rather than to check and dis-
perse concentrated private power.37  This new set of descriptive and 
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 36 Discussing “schools” of antitrust thought is rife with the hazards that attend any attempt to 
generalize the views of various groups.  This is especially true of nascent intellectual movements, 
whose still-forming nature is in tension with a desire to articulate clear and general commitments.  
Therefore my use of “Chicago,” “Post-Chicago,” and “New Brandeis” in this Review will necessarily 
be imprecise, with the hope that these terms (however imperfect) can help illuminate the current 
terrain of antitrust debate.  It is also worth noting that while the contemporary reform efforts are 
currently described as “Neo-Brandeisian,” my use of the term does not intend to suggest that the 
movement does or should adopt Justice Brandeis’s prescriptions across the board, but only that Justice 
Brandeis’s insights provide a helpful guide in navigating antitrust and antimonopolism. 
 37 On “neoliberalism” in law, see David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014).  It is worth noting that the neoliberal shift in 
antitrust was part of a more general neoliberal reorientation of law and policy.  See, e.g., Anne L. 
Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Min-
imal State, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014) (describing how neoliberalism dominates U.S. family 
law); Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014) (de-
scribing how intellectual property law debates often assume a neoliberal conception of the state); 
Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting: Toward a Postneoliberal Health-
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normative assumptions, meanwhile, provided courts with the basis for 
changing the decision rules and legal standards that constitute antitrust 
analysis — delivering the body of antitrust law that governs today.  
Tracing the overhaul of antitrust doctrine to these descriptive and nor-
mative changes provides a framework for mapping the fault lines of the 
contemporary antitrust debate. 
A.  The Chicago School Intervention & Post-Chicago Corrective 
The Chicago School’s influence on antitrust had two key elements.  
The first consisted of new economic theories and modes of analysis that 
embedded in antitrust a set of descriptive claims about markets and 
market actors.  This included both work in industrial organization eco-
nomics (IO), which targeted the “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) 
paradigm, and the application of price theory, which came to define the 
Chicago School’s contribution to antitrust analysis. 
The SCP framework guided antitrust enforcement through the 
1960s.  Informed by studies that showed a positive relationship between 
concentration and profits, the SCP paradigm represented a structuralist 
approach to antitrust, holding that concentrated market structures 
evince a lack of competition and facilitate anticompetitive conduct.38  
Structuralism began facing serious challenge from Chicago scholars in 
the 1970s, when work by Professors Harold Demsetz and Yale Brozen, 
among others, disputed the positive correlation between concentration 
and profits and argued that concentration may signal superior efficiency 
rather than a lack of competition.39  Published at a time when proposals 
for deconcentration legislation were dominating antitrust policy discus-
sions,40 this scholarship helped erode the intellectual consensus that had 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Reform Agenda, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (2014) (describing how neoliberal assumptions per-
vade health law and policy discussions); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism 
for a New Economy, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014) (describing neoliberal thought in consti-
tutional law); Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2014) (de-
scribing the neoliberal turn in election law). 
 38 JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1968). 
 39 Yale Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 13 J.L. & ECON. 
279, 292 (1970); Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 164, 174–77 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).  
But see Leonard W. Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra, at 184, 185–233 (contesting studies that claimed 
to debunk the relationship between concentration and profits and defending antitrust enforcement 
that blocked horizontal mergers in concentrated industries).  
 40 See, e.g., Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93d Cong. (1973); CARL KAYSEN & 
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959); 
PHIL C. NEAL ET AL., REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 
reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11 (1968–69); see also Harlan M. Blake, Legislative 
Proposals for Industrial Deconcentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW 
LEARNING, supra note 39, at 340 (summarizing the various deconcentration proposals). 
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supported programs to restructure industries, codify concentration thresh-
olds, and strengthen antitrust laws to reflect structuralist principles.41 
In addition to its IO-based critique, Chicago’s intervention featured 
neoclassical price theory.  Price theory assumes that market equilibrium 
is determined by the behavior of rational economic actors seeking to 
maximize profits or utility, often under the assumption of perfect or 
near-perfect competition.42  It assumes, moreover, a system of perfect 
information and nonexistent entry barriers, combining to depict a fric-
tionless world where any exercise of monopoly power resulting in wind-
fall profits will be instantly disciplined by a flood of new entrants (or 
the threat thereof).43  Chicago scholars argued that this price theory 
framework offered a “unified, coherent methodology for analyzing the 
causes and consequences of commercial activities,” including the busi-
ness practices of dominant firms.44 
Viewing firm conduct through the lens of price theory enabled  
Chicago School thinkers to reinterpret business practices and market 
outcomes previously considered anticompetitive as procompetitive or 
benign.  They argued that bright-line rules should be softened or even 
inverted; indeed, Bork held that swaths of conduct treated as per se 
illegal should instead be viewed as per se legal.45  Chicago scholars ar-
gued that this price theory approach to antitrust introduced economi-
cally coherent analysis, a stark improvement over the “untheoretical, 
descriptive, ‘institutional,’ and even metaphorical” methods that pre-
Chicago economists had used.46 
While the Chicago School’s intervention is often described in terms 
of a methodology, it is worth noting that the effect of both the “Chicago 
School of industrial organization economics” and the “Chicago School 
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 41 Kovacic, supra note 6, at 1137–38 (stating that the Airlie House Conference summarized in 
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning “supplied a forum for opponents of structural antitrust 
analysis” to dispute the economic findings that supported deconcentration measures, ultimately 
weakening the intellectual and political support for these policies, id. at 1138). 
 42 See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF COMPETITIVE PRICE 12–13, 21–24 (1942). 
 43 Posner, supra note 24, at 927 (“The predator loses money during the period of predation and, 
if he tries to recoup it later by raising his price, new entrants will be attracted, the price will be bid 
down to the competitive level, and the attempt at recoupment will fail.”). 
 44 Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
743, 772–73 (2005). 
 45 BORK, supra note 27, at 406. 
 46 Posner, supra note 24, at 928; see also id. at 929 (“Casual observation of business behavior, 
colorful characterizations (such as the term ‘barrier to entry’), eclectic forays into sociology and 
psychology, descriptive statistics, and verification by plausibility took the place of the careful defi-
nitions and parsimonious logical structure of economic theory.  The result was that industrial or-
ganization regularly advanced propositions that contradicted economic theory.”); Ronald Coase, 
The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 230 
(1984) (“The American institutionalists were not theoretical but anti-theoretical . . . .  Without a 
theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a 
fire.”). 
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of antitrust analysis” was to offer a universe of descriptive claims about 
self-correcting markets and rational market actors.47  Price theory intro-
duced not just a set of tools to analyze legal rules, but also a set of neo-
classical assumptions about incentives, causality, and effects.48   
Although a stated commitment to scientific discourse suggested that 
Chicago scholars would constantly revise their theories and embedded 
assumptions in light of empirical evidence,49 in practice many of these 
original models have remained largely unchanged.50  Courts, mean-
while, have adopted Chicago’s descriptive claims, codifying in case law 
a highly particularized, abstracted, and untested conception of how mar-
kets function.51 
The normative dimension of Chicago’s intervention also had two 
facets.  The first, as Wu notes, involved Bork’s revisionist account of 
the legislative history, in which Bork attempted to demonstrate that the 
primary goal Congress sought to advance through passing the Sherman 
Act was the promotion of allocative efficiency (pp. 88–91).  Though 
Bork’s attempt to derive this goal from the legislative history marked 
an effort to obscure his own ideological agenda, Bork’s conclusion was 
expressly normative: that the antitrust laws should be enforced for the 
purpose of promoting efficiency.52 
The other normative aspect followed from Chicago’s methodological 
commitment.  Because the economic analysis of law assesses legal rules 
on the basis of the welfare effects that they generate, a price theory ap-
proach to antitrust necessarily privileges efficiency criteria over, say, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Mar-
kets and Measuring Market Power, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 1, 25 (Paolo 
Buccirossi ed., 2008) (distinguishing between the “Chicago school of industrial organization eco-
nomics” and the “Chicago school of antitrust analysis”). 
 48 See, e.g., Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 422, 459 (1965) (“Running through all of the Bork-Bowman analysis is the 
assumption that business decisions must be motivated either by attempts to gain monopoly power 
or by efforts to improve efficiency, and that if the establishment of horizontal market power is not 
the immediate objective . . . the transaction must be designed to increase efficiency.”). 
 49 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3, 7–9 (1966). 
 50 See generally HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF 
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).  As has 
been widely noted, the Chicago School did not represent a monolithic set of views, and scholars 
associated with the Chicago School sometimes disagreed with one another.  See, e.g., Crane, supra 
note 29, at 1916–18; Kovacic, supra note 29, at 10 (identifying disagreements between Posner and 
Bork); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based 
Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 244 (2012) (“The Chicago School enjoys considerable heteroge-
neity in both economic approaches and policy prescriptions.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) 
(noting “the general implausibility of predatory pricing”).  
 52 See BORK, supra note 27, at 89 (“Only [consumer welfare as a goal] permits courts to behave 
responsibly and to achieve the virtues appropriate to law.”). 
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concerns about justice or fairness.53  In this way, even those who rejected 
Bork’s reading of legislative history could end up supporting the same 
efficiency-based conception of antitrust simply through sharing a com-
mitment to price theory.  And given that antimonopoly suspicion of 
dominant corporations stemmed from a fear that they would exercise 
their power in coercive ways (even if not strictly welfare-reducing in 
Chicago terms), collapsing anticompetitive conduct to welfare reduction 
swapped out a rich set of concerns about concentrated private power in 
favor of a benign (or even admiring) conception of the monopolist.54 
The Chicago School operationalized its approach through an error-
cost framework.  The basic insight of error-cost analysis, introduced by 
Easterbrook, is that erroneous antitrust convictions are likely to be 
much costlier than erroneous antitrust acquittals because “judicial errors 
that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while erroneous con-
demnations are not.”55  A key assumption underlying the framework is 
that anticompetitive conduct will eventually be “undone by competitive 
forces,” whereas “judicial errors that wrongly condemn a procompetitive 
practice” will lead firms to abandon beneficial practices, generating a 
significant social cost.56  Because Chicago’s application of price theory 
blurred the line between procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct, 
almost every enforcement opportunity now raised the risk not just of 
erroneously condemning conduct that did not rise to an antitrust viola-
tion, but also of erroneously condemning beneficial behavior.57 
Post-Chicago academics contested the Chicago School primarily by 
refining and qualifying the conditions under which Chicago’s theories 
held.  Where Chicago claimed that conduct viewed as anticompetitive 
was, in fact, procompetitive, Post-Chicago’s response was “it depends.”  
This view favored replacing bright-line rules with a reasonableness 
standard, which courts now apply to most forms of conduct.58  The most 
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 53 See generally Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 201–05, 212–
15 (1980).  
 54 See Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 960, 968–70 (2018) (contrasting judicial opinions by Justice Douglas and Justice Scalia to 
demonstrate how the adoption of efficiency-oriented antitrust ushered in a profoundly different 
theory of power). 
 55 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984). 
 56 Wright, supra note 50, at 248. 
 57 For a comprehensive critique of this error-cost framework, see Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the 
Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015). 
 58 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying 
rule of reason analysis to minimum resale price maintenance); NYNEX Corp. v. Disco, Inc., 525 
U.S. 128 (1998) (applying rule of reason analysis to a purely vertical agreement to refuse to deal 
with third party); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying rule of reason analysis to 
maximum resale price maintenance); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) 
(applying rule of reason analysis to vertical nonprice restraints); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The 
Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 136–37 (2018) (describing how courts have shifted away from 
the per se rule). 
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influential Post-Chicago work included Professors Steven Salop and 
Thomas Krattenmaker’s “raising rivals’ costs” model, which provided a 
framework for assessing when exclusionary conduct should be consid-
ered anticompetitive,59 and Professor Michael Whinston’s work, which 
identified the set of conditions under which a monopolist in one product 
market would have an incentive to monopolize an adjacent one.60   
Notably, while Post-Chicago criticized Chicago for being “too theoreti-
cal, simple, speculative, and unempirical,”61 Post-Chicago’s contribu-
tions similarly relied primarily on theory rather than empirics.62  
Although a group of leading antitrust scholars was challenging the 
Chicago School’s normative claims,63 Post-Chicago thinkers engaged al-
most exclusively on the descriptive front.  They issued correctives to 
Chicago’s economic models but generally accepted the overarching  
paradigm that Chicago had introduced; they “start[ed] with the Chicago 
school’s proposition that economics controls antitrust” and then “add[ed] 
complexity to the microeconomic analysis.”64  Where Bork’s definition 
of consumer welfare included producer profits, Post-Chicago’s defini-
tion “focuse[d] entirely on output and, correspondingly, low prices.”65  
By offering primarily technical modifications to Chicago’s framework, 
Post-Chicago thinkers implicitly ratified its normative and ideological 
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 59 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 234–49 (1986). 
 60 Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 841–56 
(1990). 
 61 Crane, supra note 29, at 1923. 
 62 Id. at 1915 (“Post-Chicago tries to one-up Chicagoan theories with even more attenuated the-
ories of its own, thus announcing the emperor’s nudity while wearing clothes cut of the same pur-
portedly invisible cloth.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Blake & Jones, supra note 15, at 382–85 (critiquing Bork and Bowman’s efficiency-
based conception of antitrust and underscoring the antidomination roots of antitrust law); Blake & 
Jones, supra note 48, at 422–36 (identifying the political objectives of antitrust); John J. Flynn, 
Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals of Antitrust 
Policy — Introduction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1182, 1185 (1977) (critiquing the notion that “empirical 
evidence of the world objectively quantifiable and measured against a value-free economic model 
of ‘efficiency’ should be the sole test for defining antitrust policy”); Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for 
the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 918 (1987) (“The real battle is not about where correct 
economics leads.  Rather, it is about fundamentally different views concerning law and society.”); 
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1979) (“[A]n 
antitrust policy that failed to take political concerns into account would be unresponsive to the will 
of Congress and out of touch with the rough political consensus that has supported antitrust en-
forcement for almost a century.”); Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of 
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1076–78 (1979) (highlighting deconcentration measures and an-
titrust policies that were motivated by a desire to check concentrated private power and promote 
fair treatment). 
 64 Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 795, 813 (2001).  
 65 Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled? 4 (Univ. Pa. Law 
Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 18-15, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=3197329 [https://perma.cc/A8ME-D7WS]. 
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assumptions, which remain embedded in antitrust doctrine today.   
Despite broad acknowledgment that centering antitrust on neoclassical 
conceptions of welfare had no basis in legislative history, Post-Chicago 
commentators largely endorsed (if not embraced) its adoption.  
Post-Chicago’s choice to accept Chicago’s normative paradigm 
stands in contrast with the New Brandeis intervention, which rejects 
the idea that antitrust law should be centered on promoting consumer 
welfare.  As Wu’s book stakes out, challenging this cramped normative 
vision is central to reinvigorating antitrust law as part of a broader  
antimonopoly project to structure private power to serve public ends. 
B.  The Empirical Challenge & Neo-Brandeisian Normative Critique 
This current challenge to the antitrust consensus is not altogether 
new.  A small group of thinkers has been documenting the harmful ef-
fects of increased concentration and challenging the consumer welfare 
standard for the last decade.66  However, only recently has this critique 
entered the mainstream antitrust discussion, spurring a scholarly debate 
and creating an opening for reform.  This advancement has been driven 
by critiques on both descriptive and normative grounds. 
On the descriptive front, at least two factors are straining the current 
consensus.  The first is the proliferation in recent years of empirical 
studies that document increasing concentration and declining competi-
tion.  Wu offers a high-level overview of concentration levels in major 
industries such as airlines, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications 
(pp. 115–17) — but it is worth noting that studies reveal high concen-
tration to now be a systemic, rather than isolated, feature of our econ-
omy.  These reports have identified growing concentration across the 
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 66 See, e.g., LYNN, supra note 7; Lina Khan, Obama’s Game of Chicken, WASH. MONTHLY 
(Nov./Dec. 2012), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2012/obamas-game-of-chicken 
[https://perma.cc/J6RA-5HGD]; Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, How America Became Uncom-
petitive and Unequal, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/  
opinions/how-america-became-uncompetitive-and-unequal/2014/06/13/a690ad94-ec00-11e3-b98c-
72cef4a00499_story.html [https://perma.cc/36HZ-6DAL]; Barry C. Lynn, Killing the Competition, 
HARPER’S MAG. (Feb. 2012), https://harpers.org/archive/2012/02/killing-the-competition 
[https://perma.cc/EML8-9XUU]; Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, Who Broke America’s Jobs 
Machine?, WASH. MONTHLY (Mar./Apr. 2010), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/ 
marchapril-2010/who-broke-americas-jobs-machine-3 [https://perma.cc/RS27-H9H3]; see also John 
M. Newman, Reactionary Antitrust, CONCURRENCES REV., Nov. 2019, at 66, 67–68 (tracing re-
search and articles that offered internal and external critiques of the current antitrust paradigm). 
  
1672 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:1655 
economy,67 an increase in markups,68 and a falloff in corporate invest-
ment relative to profits.69  Studies from labor economists, meanwhile, 
have shown that a majority of labor markets across the United States 
are highly concentrated,70 that higher labor market concentration corre-
lates with a decrease in wages,71 and that the drop in labor’s share of 
national income is partly due to an increase in markups.72  Macroeconomic 
trends — such as significant reductions in business dynamism and new 
business formation, along with historic levels of wealth and income in-
equality — have also been connected to increasing monopolization and 
declining competition.73  Detailed studies of merger policy have revealed 
that a significant share of mergers have resulted in price increases: out 
of fifty-three transactions that took place over the last few decades, over 
seventy-five percent resulted in price increases without any offsetting 
benefits in quality, cost, or nonprice measures.74 
This body of research is drawing wide attention and spurring 
broader policy discussions about growing market power and its mani-
fold effects.  Notably these empirical works depart from the theory-
heavy approaches of Chicago and Post-Chicago, which have been  
relatively slow to “join the empiricist bandwagon.”75  Chicago and Post-
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 67 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND 
INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ 
files/page/files/20160502_competition_issue_brief_updated_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV5S-H7P6]. 
 68 Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroe-
conomic Implications, Q.J. ECON. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1), http://www.janeeckhout. 
com/wp-content/uploads/26.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK5C-NGVT]. 
 69 Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investmentless Growth: An Empirical Investigation, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2017, at 89, 95–97; Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas 
Philippon, Ownership, Concentration, and Investment, AEA PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, 2018,  
at 432, 432, https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181010 [https://perma.cc/7HFR-D65F]; Germán  
Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Declining Competition and Investment in the U.S. 2 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23583, 2017). 
 70 José A. Azar et al., Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data 
13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24395, 2018). 
 71 José A. Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24147, 2017). 
 72 Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2, 23–
26), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3489965 [https://perma.cc/YYK3-7QXE]. 
 73 IAN HATHAWAY & ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., WHAT’S DRIVING THE 
DECLINE IN THE FIRM FORMATION RATE? A PARTIAL EXPLANATION (2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/driving_decline_firm_formation_rate_ 
hathaway_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4RS-8CC5]; Joshua Gans et al., Inequality and Market Con-
centration, When Shareholding Is More Skewed than Consumption (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 25395, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3306105 [https://perma.cc/ 
EEL9-YYAJ].  
 74 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions 
and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 631–32 (2013); see also JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, 
MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY (2014). 
 75 Crane, supra note 29, at 1931 (“There is an opportunity for entrepreneurial scholars from 
either camp to begin serious programs of empirical work on antitrust.”). 
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Chicago scholars, meanwhile, have responded with skepticism and  
criticism to several of these studies, casting doubt on their methodologies 
and alleging that some are replicating the mistakes of the SCP frame-
work.76  While detailing the specific critiques (and responses) is beyond 
the scope of this Review, the friction underscores how the longstanding 
dominance of Chicago and Post-Chicago has led antitrust analysis to be 
governed by a fairly closed set of methodological approaches that — as 
new research is now highlighting — suffer from critical blindspots.  The 
growing interest from non-IO subfields — including from researchers in 
labor economics, macroeconomics, and public finance, to name a few — 
has the potential to yield greater methodological pluralism in the field.77 
A second factor is the failure, in several high-profile instances, of the 
current antitrust approach to deliver the procompetitive outcome.  For 
example, last year the Justice Department lost its challenge to the 
AT&T/Time Warner transaction, first failing to convince a federal dis-
trict court that the merger may substantially lessen competition and then 
again failing on appeal.78  In the course of that review, District Court 
for the District of Columbia Judge Leon flatly rejected the government’s 
predictions about how AT&T would exercise its newfound bargaining 
power, accepting instead AT&T’s argument that the firm couldn’t use 
the merger to gain leverage over customers and hike costs.79  Within 
months of completing the deal, AT&T withheld HBO from Dish during 
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 76 See, e.g., Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton & Martin Gaynor, Do Increasing Markups Matter? 
Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2019, at 44, 45 (“[A] 
number of recent studies of markups . . . employ an analytical approach that was broadly rejected 
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document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)69/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/YVS9-YTPM]. 
 77 While empirical studies have most clearly drawn public attention and raised policy awareness, 
economists have also been offering compelling theory-based critiques of the consumer welfare 
standard.  See, e.g., Mark Glick, The Unsound Theory Behind the Consumer (and Total) Welfare 
Goal in Antitrust, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 455 (2018); Mark Glick, American Gothic: How Chicago 
Economics Distorts “Consumer Welfare” in Antitrust (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Pa-
per No. 99, 2019), https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_99-Glick-Consumer-
Welfare.pdf [https://perma.cc/NJZ4-VDQK]. 
 78 See United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1046–47 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. 
AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 165 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 79 See AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 199. 
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contract negotiations,80 thereby fulfilling opponents’ predictions about 
how the merged entity would use its power to exercise leverage.81  And 
while AT&T had stated that the transaction would enable it to lower 
consumer prices,82 AT&T has increased prices instead, raising some bills 
by fifty percent.83  While it may be tempting to dismiss the government’s 
loss as the product of an unlucky judicial assignment,84 the instance 
underscored the costs of abandoning the framework of structural power 
in favor of microeconomic modeling, which prompted the government 
to center its challenge partly on an argument about whether consumers 
would pay thirty cents more as a result of the transaction.85  The fact 
that the government’s economic expert had first conceded that AT&T 
would lower prices, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in con-
sumer savings — contravening how AT&T actually went on to use its 
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 80 See Klint Finley, HBO Goes Dark on Dish. Monopolist Move, or Publicity Stunt?, WIRED 
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 82 Post-Trial Brief of Defendants AT&T Inc., DIRECTV Group Holdings, LLC, and Time 
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power — raises further questions about how experts on both sides could 
have gotten it so wrong.86 
Closer study also suggests that the purported benefits of a price  
theory–based and consumer welfare–oriented antitrust — that it would 
deliver a coherent and stable regime — have been overstated.87  Critics 
have argued that consumer welfare suffers from conceptual deficiencies 
and raises serious practical difficulties, arguments that consumer wel-
fare proponents have yet to seriously engage or rebut.88  More recently, 
Neo-Brandeisian critiques of the consumer welfare standard, along with 
empirical research showing that it has delivered higher prices and lower 
wages, have surfaced disagreement among antitrust experts about the 
parameters of consumer welfare.  Some scholars, for example, have re-
cently argued that consumer welfare may instead connote “trading part-
ner welfare,”89 accommodating for anticompetitive effects on workers 
and producers.   
Lodging antitrust analysis in economic theory, meanwhile, has 
yielded a system where “[c]ourts and enforcement agencies retain broad 
discretion in selecting theoretical models ad hoc, tailoring decisions to 
the arbiter’s relative economic sophistication, intellectual priors, or even 
desired result”90 — resonant of the same “ad hoc” nature of enforcement 
that Chicago School scholars criticized in the pre-Chicago era.91  And 
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the “rule of reason” standard under which courts now assess the vast 
majority of conduct has been widely criticized by judges, enforcers, and 
scholars for delivering an antitrust regime that is unwieldy, indetermi-
nate, and unadministrable.92  The fact that plaintiffs lose the over-
whelming majority of cases governed by the rule of reason suggests the 
primary respect in which the current system provides stability is through 
shielding defendants from liability.93 
Growing signs that the current approach to antitrust has failed even 
on its own terms, then, have created an opening for Neo-Brandeisian 
scholars to revisit foundational questions and make the case for recov-
ering an approach to antitrust that is rooted in its antimonopoly values.  
While some have argued that debating the goals of antitrust is largely 
an academic exercise without much bearing on enforcement trends,94 
the broad mandate and sweeping language of the antitrust statutes 
means that their enforcement hinges on the underlying normative vi-
sion.95  Where the Post-Chicago School absorbed the Chicago School’s 
ideological commitments, the New Brandeisians reject them — holding 
that the major problem we face today is not just a lack of enforcement, 
but the current theory of antitrust.96  Since Chicago introduced a new 
normative conception of antitrust, challenging its dominance will re-
quire offering an alternative normative vision of what the law stands 
for and how it can be operationalized.  Attempts to reform an ideological 
project through technical fixes are likely to fail.97 
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antitrust laws requires “confront[ing] competing aims and expectations about what the law is sup-
posed to achieve and how it should go about doing so,” id. at 2166). 
 96 Khan, supra note 13, at 131. 
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The reaction of several Post-Chicago scholars to the New Brandeis 
project further highlights this key difference.  While Neo-Brandeisians 
tend to advocate an approach to antitrust that is democratic in both its 
aims and its enforcement (pp. 127–30),98 the Post-Chicago response 
seems to exhibit a reflexive fear or distrust of greater democratization.99  
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, considered “the dean of American  
antitrust,”100 has derided the surge in public attention as “movement 
antitrust,” warning that elected officials seem to be shifting their anti-
trust views to appeal to the “illiterati” rather than hewing to the wisdom 
of the “antitrust cognoscenti.”101  Professor Carl Shapiro has cautioned 
that the “populist sentiments” driving renewed focus on corporate con-
centration pose “a fundamental danger” and that antitrust reform efforts 
should remain strictly focused on “channeling more of the benefits of 
economic growth to consumers.”102  While these responses may not 
speak for the full range of Post-Chicago perspectives, they suggest that 
Post-Chicago reform efforts will continue to embrace Chicago’s norma-
tive conception of antitrust — as a technocratic enterprise squarely  
focused on increasing consumer welfare and in which decisionmaking 
power rests with a small number of academic and policy elites.  The 
New Brandeis School that Wu and others seek to build parts company 
with this vision. 
III.  ANTITRUST’S INSTITUTIONAL TURN 
In recent decades, antitrust scholarship and policy discussion have 
tended to focus far more on substantive doctrine than on the institu-
tional features of antitrust law and policy.103  This lopsided attention 
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seems to reflect, in part, the degree to which economic analysis now 
dominates antitrust.  The major questions in antitrust often take the 
form of inquiring whether doctrine adequately reflects sound economic 
reasoning.  Yet the institutional structure of antitrust has been critical 
to the transformation of its substantive rules.  Indeed, the extraordinary 
latitude that courts enjoy in crafting antitrust policy helped account for 
both the relative swiftness with which Chicago’s descriptive and nor-
mative claims reoriented antitrust — as well as the stubbornness with 
which even now-refuted theories remain firmly embedded in case law.104  
Looking ahead, reforming the institutional structure of antitrust offers 
a potentially rich pathway for Neo-Brandeisian efforts to both democ-
ratize antitrust and remedy its doctrinal deficiencies.  At minimum,  
engaging with institutional questions should be a key facet of the move-
ment’s scholarly agenda. 
It is no secret that antitrust law is treated by courts as “excep-
tional.”105  Given that the foundational antitrust statutes are written  
in sweeping language, scholars and judges have long argued that law-
makers who passed the Sherman Act delegated to the judiciary broad 
powers to craft the substantive rules of antitrust law.106  Although aca-
demics who have closely studied the legislative history note that the text 
of the Sherman Act drew on specific and longstanding common law  
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doctrines — providing courts with a set of prohibited trade  
practices107 — in practice the “standardless delegation” theory of anti-
trust has prevailed.108  As a result, the Supreme Court “has long-since 
ceased interpreting the Sherman Act as a statute” and instead “begun 
treating it as a license to create substantive, common law rules.”109  Not 
only have judges supplanted their traditional interpretive task of statu-
tory gap-filling with judicial lawmaking, but they have “violat[ed] every 
conceivable canon of statutory interpretation”  along the way.110  Even 
the most ardent textualists show “casual disregard” for the text of the 
antitrust laws, and statutory text generally receives only passing men-
tion in antitrust cases.111  “[C]ontrol over the meaning of the antitrust 
laws” now rests “firmly in the grip of this unelected judiciary.”112 
Several of the flaws that Wu identifies in current antitrust law trace 
back to (or at least were enabled by) this institutional structure.  For 
one, an antitrust system where legal rules are devised exclusively by 
Article III judges who approach antitrust as a domain of “law made by 
judges as they see fit” bears signs of democratic illegitimacy.113  The fact 
that the Court one day declared that “Congress designed the Sherman 
Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription,’” — thereby overriding a clear 
legislative record with a fictitious account that remains law today114 — 
exemplifies this hazard.  Coupling this freewheeling interpretive ap-
proach with an exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication has 
yielded a system of antitrust rules that is unpredictable and indetermi-
nate, undermining traditional rule-of-law principles.115 
The current structure also reveals significant institutional misalign-
ments.  For example, antitrust adjudication has become highly reliant 
on technical evidence and complex economic analysis, but generalist 
judges often lack the expertise to independently assess the arguments 
before them.116  Courts have sought to compensate for this institutional 
deficiency by relying on amicus briefs and third-party experts for the 
economic reasoning justifying antitrust rules, partially mirroring how 
administrative agencies solicit and review comments on proposed  
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rulemaking.117  In practice, then, antitrust adjudications have quasi-
adopted a key feature of administrative rulemaking, even while forego-
ing its procedural safeguards and informational benefits.118  The fact 
that the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence informally relies on 
this “hybrid” rulemaking119 — with its attendant constraints and ten-
sions — further suggests that the current institutional structure of anti-
trust is not best suited to delivering a sound and coherent body of law. 
A final factor that renders these institutional questions ripe for fur-
ther study is that the current structure of antitrust enforcement is at 
odds with lawmakers’ intended design.  Numerous scholars have docu-
mented how the Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States120 — where the Court introduced the distinction 
between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” restraints of trade121 — 
prompted a wave of activity among lawmakers who viewed the Court’s 
opinion as a judicial power grab.122  Within four years Congress had 
passed the Clayton Act — which banned specific types of business con-
duct, thereby curbing judicial discretion — and the Federal Trade  
Commission Act, which created an administrative agency tasked  
with shaping antitrust rules.  Lawmakers assigned the Federal Trade  
Commission (FTC) expansive information-gathering authorities and a 
broad mandate to police “unfair methods of competition,” reflecting a 
vision of an agency that would continuously track business conduct and 
“make explicit those unexpressed standards of fair dealing” that  
Congress had outlined.123 
Despite this broad mandate and expansive set of tools, the FTC has 
largely neglected to play an administrative, norm-creating role, instead 
opting to pursue antitrust enforcement exclusively through adjudica-
tion.124  As Wu briefly notes, the FTC retains latent competition rule-
making authority that enables the Commission to devise market-specific 
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rules and clarify the conditions under which business practices consti-
tute an “unfair method of competition” (p. 134).125  Reorienting the FTC 
to serve an administrative function in antitrust would rebalance the in-
stitutional structure away from the courts, allowing the FTC to make 
full use of its extensive data-collection authority and promoting market 
rules that better keep pace with new business practices.  This shift, 
moreover, could subject antitrust to far greater public accountability 
and democratic checks.  Alternative institutional reforms could likely 
also help rehabilitate antitrust in ways New Brandeis thinkers support.  
Key will be viewing the institutional dimension as an important site of 
reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing the annual Supreme Court Foreword in 1984, Frank  
Easterbrook celebrated that the Court’s most recent antitrust opinions 
“read like short treatises on microeconomic analysis.”126  Antitrust law 
and analysis since then has continued to become increasingly techno-
cratic, captive to a highly limited form of economics, and unmoored 
from its democratic roots.  Breaking with this trend, The Curse of  
Bigness aims to renew antitrust as a tool for checking and distributing 
concentrated private power — a legal project that Wu reminds was once 
seen as critical for safeguarding a democratic republic.  By distilling 
antitrust to these core values, Wu has helped contribute to a public con-
versation about the risks of extreme economic concentration and the 
need to recover the antimonopoly philosophy of thinkers like Justice 
Brandeis.  This conversation, in turn, is taking place against the back-
drop of a broader “law and political economy” movement that is inter-
rogating how laws that structure markets and our economy can be  
reconstituted to promote egalitarian and democratic ends.127  Although 
The Curse of Bigness places antitrust at the center of the antimonopoly 
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agenda, a host of other legal reforms and interventions — including re-
newing labor law and protecting workers’ organizations, reinvigorating 
public utility regulations, and adopting public options — will also be 
needed to achieve the antimonopoly goals of rebalancing power and 
checking private domination.128 
The task now facing New Brandeisian reformers is to translate their 
critiques into a positive vision, including legal rules and analytical 
frameworks that should govern how courts and enforcers assess what 
the antitrust laws prohibit.  In rejecting a strictly welfare-based theory 
of antitrust, Neo-Brandeisians have an opportunity to design an anti-
trust regime that reflects republican values and democratizes the insti-
tutional structure of antitrust.  Realizing this vision will be no easy task, 
but the moment for it is ripe. 
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